

1 Michael J. McCue (Nevada Bar No. 6055)
2 mmccue@LRLAW.com
3 John L. Krieger (Nevada Bar No. 6023)
jkrieger@LRLAW.com
4 LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
5 Tel: (702) 949-8200
Fax: (702) 949-8363
6

7 David D. Weinzwieg (*pro hac vice* application to be submitted)
dweinzwieg@LRLAW.com
8 LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
40 North Central Avenue
9 Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Tel: (602) 262-5311
10 Fax: (602) 262-5358

11 Anthony J. DeGidio (*pro hac vice* application to be submitted)
12 712 Farrer St.
Maumee, Ohio 43537
13 Tel: (419) 509-1878
Fax: (419) 740-2556
14

15 Attorneys for Plaintiff
LENS.COM, INC.
16

17 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

18 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

19 LENST.COM, INC., a Nevada corporation,)
20 Plaintiff,) Case No.: 2:11-cv-00918-GMN-RJJ
21 vs.)
22)
23 1-800 CONTACTS, INC., a Delaware)
corporation,)
24 Defendant.)
25 _____)
26)
27)
28)

For its Complaint against defendant 1-800 Contacts, Inc. (“1-800”), plaintiff Lens.com, Inc. (“Lens”) alleges as follows:

NATURE OF ACTION

4 1. 1-800 has long fashioned itself as a champion of consumers and an outspoken
5 advocate for open and robust competition. 1-800 has emphasized, in particular, the importance of
6 informed consumers who understand their alternatives. Indeed, in its protracted battle with eye
7 care practitioners and manufacturers, 1-800 often decried the conduct of entrenched business
8 interests that zealously guarded their pecuniary self-interest at the expense of meaningful
9 consumer choice and greater competition.

10 2. It was all a ruse. This lawsuit is about 1-800's bold and unlawful crusade to obtain
11 or maintain its dominant position in the direct-to-consumer market for replacement contact lenses,
12 and the horizontal agreements that 1-800 extracted from its direct competitors to restrict output
13 and restrain trade. Notwithstanding its carefully crafted image, 1-800 has battled to censor and
14 impede the universe of information that can be passed on to consumers; and conspired to ensure
15 that consumers never taste the fruits of competition.

16 3. 1-800 has engaged in a host of anticompetitive practices to obtain or maintain its
17 market dominance, restrict output and otherwise restrain trade, including:

18 a) 1-800 has manufactured a fictional collection of trademark rights and bullied
19 its competitors with false accusations of trademark infringement and frivolous litigation.

1 c) 1-800 understood and lamented the actual scope of its limited trademark
2 rights, and knew that its demands far outstripped its actual trademark rights. 1-800 was
3 nevertheless convinced that its competitors in the Relevant Market could not afford to fight 1-800,
4 which meant that 1-800 need not concern itself with actual trademark rights; 1-800 could instead
5 enforce the trademark rights it dreamed of.

6 d) 1-800 sued all competitors who had the temerity to refuse its demands.
7 Between 2005 and 2010 alone, 1-800 filed over 15 repetitive, predominantly sham lawsuits
8 against its competitors. In these lawsuits, 1-800 asserted objectively baseless claims against its
9 competitors without regard to merits and without a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but
10 rather to harass, neutralize and vanquish its competition. From extensive practice, 1-800's
11 litigation apparatus has become a well-oiled machine. Indeed, 1-800 now has a form complaint
12 for its frequent lawsuits against competitors, which is always at the ready and requires little more
13 than a new caption from lawsuit to lawsuit.

14 e) When Lens refused to accede to 1-800's demands, 1-800 unleashed the
15 litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear war in response to the damage equivalent of a hangnail.
16 The district court determined that 1-800's infringement claim, if successful, might have fetched
17 twenty dollars and fifty-one cents (\$20.51) in lost profits. Nonetheless, 1-800 poured enormous
18 financial and other resources into the lawsuit, and pursued scorched-earth tactics usually reserved
19 for bet-the-company litigation. In the end, upon information and belief, 1-800 spent around
20 \$1,100,000 in attorneys' fees to chase \$20.51 in damages.

21 f) In late 2010, the district court tossed 1-800's lawsuit against Lens in a
22 comprehensive 65-page decision. By then, however, 1-800 had achieved its objective. Lens had
23 incurred in excess of \$1,400,000 in litigation fees and expenses to defend against 1-800's
24 frivolous infringement claims.

25 g) Undeterred, 1-800 now hopes to revive its lawsuit and extend the pain based
26 upon “new evidence.” Once again, however, 1-800 has no basis for its argument. The federal
27 court dismissed 1-800’s lawsuit on December 14, 2010, while its so-called “new evidence” is from
28 November 30, 2009.

1 1-800's anticompetitive behavior has violated state and federal antitrust laws, the Lanham Act and
 2 Nevada common law. Lens files this lawsuit to stop 1-800's misconduct and anticompetitive
 3 practices; to recover compensatory and treble damages; and to obtain injunctive and other
 4 equitable relief. Lens further seeks declaratory relief in connection with 1-800's asserted
 5 trademark rights.

6 **PARTIES**

7 4. Lens is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada
 8 and is registered to conduct and conducts business in the State of Nevada.

9 5. 1-800 is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at in Draper,
 10 Utah. 1-800 conducts business and has business operations in the State of Nevada. 1-800 is a
 11 subsidiary of Fenway Partners LLP.

12 6. Various other persons, firms and corporations, not named as defendants herein and
 13 presently unknown to Lens, have participated as co-conspirators with 1-800 and have performed
 14 acts and made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy and/or in furtherance of the
 15 anticompetitive, unfair or deceptive conduct.

16 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

17 7. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims asserted herein
 18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1337, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 26
 19 and 15 U.S.C. § 1121. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims pursuant to
 20 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

21 8. This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant 1-800, which purposefully
 22 directs its activities to Nevada residents, consummates transactions with Nevada residents and
 23 purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State of Nevada, thus
 24 invoking the benefits and protections of Nevada law. 1-800 has conducted and does conduct
 25 business within the State of Nevada, has entered and continues to enter contractual relationships
 26 with residents of Nevada, has and continues to advertise to residents of Nevada, has and continues
 27 to solicit and accept orders from Nevada consumers, has and continues to ship orders to Nevada
 28 consumers, and offers an interactive website for Nevada consumers to access. The exercise of

1 personal jurisdiction over 1-800 is therefore reasonable and comports with notions of fair play and
2 substantial justice.

3 9. Venue is proper in the District of Nevada under 15 U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. §
4 1391. 1-800 is found and transacts business in the District, and the District has personal
5 jurisdiction over 1-800.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE

7 10. 1-800 is engaged in interstate commerce and the unlawful conduct described herein
8 substantially affects interstate commerce.

BACKGROUND

THE CONTACT LENS BUSINESS

11 11. Almost 40 million consumers in the United States wear replacement soft contact
12 lenses for their vision correction needs. Replacement soft contact lenses were first commercially
13 available in 1987.

14 12. Consumers must have a valid prescription to purchase contact lenses. Prescriptions
15 are available from eye care professionals (“ECPs”) such as optometrists or ophthalmologists after
16 an eye examination and fitting. Contact lens prescriptions generally specify a particular brand
17 name and are usually written for a period of one or two years.

18 13. Consumers purchase their contact lens requirements from two different submarkets
19 or channels: the brick-and-mortar submarket (sometimes called the “traditional market”), and the
20 direct-to-consumer submarket (sometimes called the “alternative market”).

14. Retailers in the traditional market operate from physical storefronts with at least one ECP on premises to examine and fit consumers who visit their storefronts. These retailers include independent ECP offices, optical chains, mass merchandisers and wholesale clubs.

24 15. The alternative market is comprised of retailers that sell replacement contact lenses
25 directly to consumers via the Internet, telephone and mail. Alternative retailers generally
26 concentrate on replacement contact lens sales. They do not operate from physical storefronts, do
27 not have optometrists or ophthalmologists on premises, and do not offer eye examinations or
28 fittings.

THE RELEVANT MARKET AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY

16. The relevant product market at issue here is direct-to-consumer sales of replacement contact lenses. The relevant geographic market is the United States. Hereinafter, the relevant product and geographic markets are collectively identified as the “Relevant Market.”

17. The Relevant Market represents a separate and distinct submarket from the traditional, brick-and-mortar submarket (i.e., independent ECP offices, optical chains, mass merchandisers and wholesale clubs) based upon functional, financial, technical and economic factors.

a) In contrast to the Relevant Market, merchants in the traditional market operate from physical storefronts or professional offices, maintain at least one ECP on-site to examine and fit their customers, and issue contact lens prescriptions.

b) Traditional merchants do not set their prices based on prices in the Relevant Market, and vice versa. According to an economist with the Federal Trade Commission (“F.T.C.”) who examined online and offline prices for contact lenses: “[O]ffline firms set prices on the assumption that most of their customers are unaware of online prices.” See James C. Cooper, *Prices and Price Dispersion in Online and Offline Markets for Contact Lenses*, F.T.C. Bureau of Economics Working Paper (2006).

c) Upon information and belief, consumers who purchase their contact lens requirements from the traditional market do not generally consult the Relevant Market and are unaware of Relevant Market prices. Public awareness of the Relevant Market is limited due to various factors, including the dual function and financial interest of ECPs who generate substantial revenues from contact lens sales. According to 1-800: “As both a seller and prescriber, ECPs have little incentive to promote the portability of prescriptions that they issue. . . . ECPs have a powerful economic motivation to ensure that patients buy lenses from them. . . . [T]he fact that 92% of consumers purchase contact lenses directly from their prescriber and the prescriber affiliated retail location indicates that public awareness of one’s ability to obtain lenses from alternative sellers and consumer awareness of consumers’ rights are fairly limited.” See Comments of 1-800 Contacts, F.T.C. Project No. R411002 (2004).

1 d) The Relevant Market and traditional market are governed by very different
 2 regulatory schemes that insulate the respective markets from competition on the merits. 1-800 has
 3 explained: “State laws are set up to protect this conflict of interest so that eye care practitioners, in
 4 some cases, can avoid competing on the merits, like service and price. They don’t offer evening
 5 service, they don’t answer their phones on weekends, they don’t inventory very many contact
 6 lenses and keep customers waiting longer than they might otherwise have to, and many don’t offer
 7 direct shipment through their offices to the customer’s home or office.” *See* Comments of 1-800
 8 Contacts, F.T.C. Project No. R411002 (2004).

9 e) Actual price differences demonstrate the absence of cross-elasticity of
 10 consumer demand between the Relevant Market and the traditional, brick-and-mortar market.
 11 Upon information and belief, average contact lens prices in the Relevant Market are generally far
 12 less than those offered by ECPs and optical chains. Consumers spend around 20 percent less for
 13 contacts in the Relevant Market.

14 f) Demand in traditional market is unaffected by price changes in the Relevant
 15 Market. Upon information and belief, price changes in the traditional market do not directly affect
 16 demand in the Relevant Market, and vice versa.

17 g) Although some traditional merchants maintain an Internet presence, these
 18 “hybrid” retailers fall outside of the Relevant Market for various reasons, including price.
 19 According to an F.T.C. economist: “[H]ybrid pricing is substantially higher than that for pure
 20 online merchants. In fact, a closer examination of the data reveals that with the exception of Wal-
 21 Mart online, hybrid sites’ pricing reflects the pricing of their offline counterparts.” *See* James C.
 22 Cooper, *Prices and Price Dispersion in Online and Offline Markets for Contact Lenses*, F.T.C.
 23 Bureau of Economics Working Paper (2006).

24 h) The Relevant Market provides substantial convenience to consumers,
 25 including the convenience of shopping at home. No travel is necessary. There are no lines.
 26 Consumers can submit their orders at any time, including evenings and weekends.

27 i) In the traditional market, by contrast, consumers must physically travel from
 28 their work or home to merchants who operate from professional offices, shopping malls or

1 detached retail structures; and incur the attendant travel costs associated therewith. Consumers
 2 often must stand in line. Merchants are geographically dispersed and use varied business models.
 3 Consumers are generally restricted to normal business hours. Customers have inconsistent
 4 experiences depending upon the staff members who serve them. Multiple trips are required if and
 5 when these retailers do not have a particular lens in stock, which must then be ordered.

6 j) Convenience and travel are substantial factors for consumers who attach a
 7 high value to their time; this is especially true of consumers who reside in rural areas far from
 8 traditional retailers. An F.T.C. Report explained: “Research in transportation economics suggests
 9 that individuals value urban travel time by automobile and public transit at between 75 and 178
 10 percent of their wage rate. At the average private hourly wage of \$14.61 (December 2001), an
 11 hour-long trip to Wal-Mart to buy replacement lenses has an implicit time cost of between \$10.96
 12 and \$26.66. That figure represents a markup of between 50 and 130 percent over the price of a
 13 multipack. Therefore, the convenience cost of policies that impede entry by mail-order
 14 replacement lens sellers could be substantial.” *See Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-*
 15 *Commerce: Contact Lenses* (F.T.C. Mar. 2004).

16 k) Unlike the traditional market, retailers in the Relevant Market utilize a
 17 homogeneous business model, offer a uniform customer experience, and operate from one
 18 location.

19 l) Upon information and belief, certain customers in the Relevant Market have
 20 unique circumstances that prevent them from turning to the traditional market, and vice versa.
 21 Customers might not have Internet or telephone access, or might not have credit cards.

22 m) Unlike the traditional market, the Relevant Market offers rapid home
 23 delivery, and tracking capabilities for consumers to monitor the status of their order. Relevant
 24 Market consumers have become accustomed to, and expectant of, full control over their
 25 transactions as well as the immediacy of such transactions. These consumers much prefer an
 26 online transaction that they initiate. These considerations are “particularly important to consumers
 27 who wait until the last minute to replace their lenses, consumers who may lose or tear lenses, and
 28 consumers who travel. Notably, many consumers are willing to pay a premium for convenience.

1 For example, approximately 33 [percent] of 1-800's customers choose express mail services,
 2 despite the additional fee of \$15-18 per order." *See* Comments of 1-800 Contacts, F.T.C. Project
 3 No. R411002 (2004).

4 n) The Relevant Market is comprised of retailers that maintain huge inventories
 5 of product in order to instantly meet the diverse preferences of consumers across the United States.
 6 Consumers in the Relevant Market are thus ensured of a greater selection and immediate
 7 availability. For instance, 1-800 carries 95 percent of the types of contact lenses that consumers
 8 purchase. 1-800 often boasts that it maintains the inventory of roughly 3,000 average ECP offices
 9 combined.

10 o) Traditional merchants need not and do not maintain huge inventories. Upon
 11 information and belief, 1-800 believes that its large inventory of contact lenses provides it with a
 12 competitive advantage over ECPs, optical chains and discount stores.

13 p) Consumers in the Relevant Market have access to dynamic, interactive
 14 content on a real-time basis. Unlike the traditional market, the Relevant Market facilitates
 15 opportunities for consumers to compare prices, obtain product information, obtain general
 16 information about vision and eye care, and ask vendors questions via e-mail or telephone.
 17 Customers are empowered by Internet search engines to gather and compare information about
 18 price and service from alternative retail sources.

19 q) Upon information and belief, contact lens manufacturers have distinguished
 20 and continue to distinguish between the Relevant Market and traditional market in regards to
 21 price, products and relationship terms. Manufacturers have historically refused to distribute
 22 particular products in the Relevant Market, and have often entered exclusive contracts with
 23 traditional merchants that prohibited Relevant Market sales. Indeed, until 2007 or so, nearly all
 24 major manufacturers of contact lenses refused to sell their products directly to retailers in the
 25 Relevant Market and prohibited their distributors from doing so, too.

26 r) ECPs have long advocated that the Relevant Market is separate and distinct
 27 from traditional channels based on various factors; from the total service experience to patient
 28 wellness considerations. In addition, ECPs have long battled to erect unique obstacles for

1 consumers and retailers in the Relevant Market. *See* Comments of 1-800 Contacts, F.T.C. Project
 2 No. R411002 (2004).

3 18. The Relevant Market is characterized by significant barriers to entry and expansion.
 4 For instance:

5 a) Minimum efficient scale. A prospective entrant must acquire and possess a
 6 substantial inventory of replacement contact lenses to attract consumers and meet their demands
 7 with prompt shipment. A prospective entrant must likewise acquire distribution rights from
 8 manufacturers to a minimum portfolio of replacement contact lenses to attract consumers to its
 9 retail websites and to persuade additional manufacturers to sell their products through the would-
 10 be entrant's website. It must also attract enough customers to cover its substantial operating
 11 expenses. Upon information and belief, 1-800 has expressed that its inventory serves as an
 12 effective barrier to entry in the Relevant Market.

13 b) Administrative, promotional, advertising and operating expenses.
 14 Prospective entrants must invest enormous sunk costs into their business before distributing a
 15 single contact lens – none of which can be recovered if the venture fails. Entrants must, for
 16 instance, ramp up supply; again, without any promise of sale. Entrants must invest substantially in
 17 the information systems and Internet infrastructure necessary to support customer sales. Entrants
 18 must also locate, hire and train personnel, meet payroll, manage inventory, and purchase or lease
 19 equipment and real estate. Entrants must also incur promotional expenses to introduce their
 20 business to and attract the general public; and related continued expenses for collateral material,
 21 an Internet presence, etc. Given 1-800's propensity to sue all competitors, entrants should include
 22 substantial litigation expense as a price of admission.

23 c) Market concentration, a dominant incumbent and entrenched buyer
 24 preferences. 1-800 has dominated the Relevant Market for several years, and its market power
 25 remains unchecked. These factors, coupled with 1-800's low marginal costs, discourage
 26 prospective entrants in the Relevant Market.

27 d) 1-800's conduct. 1-800's anticompetitive conduct and practices also serve to
 28 deter and prevent prospective competitors from entering the Relevant Market, and thus protect 1-

1 800's dominant position. 1-800 has invested enormous financial resources to ensure that
2 consumers lack confidence in 1-800's competitors; and its frequent threats and lawsuits against
3 competitors prevent competition on the merits. To begin with, nascent competitors who must fund
4 litigation are unable to lower retail prices. More generally, however, prospective entrants are less
5 likely to enter the Relevant Market in the first place after learning that 1-800 sues its competitors
6 for trademark infringement as a matter of standard operating procedure.

7 e) Close relationships. The Relevant Market is uniquely dependent upon
8 relationships with manufacturers and consumers. Prospective entrants must establish and maintain
9 such relationships.

1-800 CONTACTS

11 19. 1-800 operates in the Relevant Market. 1-800 sells replacement contact lenses
12 directly to consumers with valid prescriptions who place orders by telephone, mail and the
13 Internet.

14 20. 1-800 describes itself as “the market leader in the field of replacement contact
15 lenses” and “the largest seller of contact lenses to American consumers.”

16 21. 1-800 boasts that it sells "as many contact lenses in one day as 2,500 retail optical
17 shops combined and more contact lenses than all other online contact lens retailers combined."

18 22. 1-800's customers are located throughout the United States. On the Internet, 1-800
19 operates under the domain name www.1800contacts.com.

20 23. Upon information and belief, 1-800 has possessed and maintained a dominant share
21 of the Relevant Market at all times material here, with a consistent market share in excess of 55
22 percent. In April 2004, 1-800 informed the F.T.C. that it controlled 70 percent of the Relevant
23 Market.

24 24. 1-800 is consistently the most expensive or among the most expensive Internet
25 sources for consumers to purchase their replacement contact lenses. In November of 2006, an
26 F.T.C. economist reported that 1-800 was among the most expensive online retailers of contact
27 lenses, while two competitors, Coastal Contacts and Contact Lens Discounts, offered among the
28 lowest prices. 1-800 has sued both.

1 *I-800 CONTACTS: GENERIC NAME AND WEAK TRADEMARK*

2 25. 1-800 was founded in February 1995 as “1-800-LENSNOW,” but changed its name
 3 to “1-800 CONTACTS” in July 1995. Jonathan Coon, founder and CEO, explained the rationale
 4 behind the change as follows: “[W]e knew [the name] would separate us from everyone else in
 5 the industry and give us a significant advantage with every advertising dollar we spent. People
 6 never forget the phone number.”

7 26. Allen Hwang is the Chief Marketing Officer at 1-800. Mr. Hwang explained the
 8 rationale behind the name change as follows: “1-800 CONTACTS is an easily memorable name
 9 and enabled us to benefit from competitors’ advertising, *i.e.* consumers would call us after seeing a
 10 Lens Express ad.” *See* Jamie Huish Stum, *A Rose By Any Other Name*, ENTREPRENEUR
 11 MAGAZINE, Feb. 2009.

12 27. After 1-800 changed to its new generic name, the company experienced an
 13 immediate and substantial bump in sales without the need for any advertising. According to
 14 ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE: “Without spending a dime on advertising, 1-800 CONTACTS
 15 received 2,000 calls the first month, producing \$38,000 in revenue.” *See id.*

16 28. 1-800 has registered several trademarks in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
 17 including:

MARK	REG. NO.	DATE
1800CONTACTS	2,731,114	January 21, 2003
1800CONTACTS	2,675,866	July 1, 2003

22 29. Since at least 2004, 1-800 has known and publicly lamented the fact that it does not
 23 hold and cannot hold property rights in the 1-800 CONTACTS telephone number or Internet
 24 address.

25 30. On May 21, 2004, 1-800 filed its Form 10-K report with the Securities and
 26 Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003. 1-800 disclosed that: “We
 27 also have obtained the rights to various Internet addresses, including but not limited to
 28 www.1800contacts.com, www.contacts.com and www.contactlenses.com. We cannot practically

1 acquire rights to all addresses similar to www.contacts.com. If third parties obtain rights to use
2 similar addresses, these third parties may confuse our customers and cause our customers to
3 inadvertently place orders with these third parties, which could result in lost sales for us and could
4 damage our brand. As with telephone numbers, we do not have and cannot acquire any property
5 rights in Internet addresses. As a result, we may be unable to retain the use of our Internet
6 addresses. The loss of our ability to use our Internet addresses would harm our business.”

7 31. On March 15, 2007, 1-800 filed its Form 10-K report with the Securities and
8 Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006. 1-800 disclosed that: "The
9 Company also has obtained the rights to various Internet addresses, including but not limited to
10 www.1800contacts.com, www.contacts.com, www.contactlenses.com, www.evision.com and
11 www.1800eyedoctor.com. As with phone numbers, the Company does not have and cannot
12 acquire any property rights in Internet addresses. The Company does not expect to lose the ability
13 to use the Internet addresses; however, there can be no assurance in this regard and such loss
14 would have a material adverse effect on the Company's business, financial position and results of
15 operations."

LENS.COM

17 32. Lens operates in the Relevant Market. It concentrates exclusively on direct-to-
18 consumer sales of replacement contact lenses over the Internet. Lens has been a direct competitor
19 of 1-800 since incorporated in 1998.

20 33. Lens has registered several trademarks in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
21 including but not limited to:

MARK	REG. NO.	DATE
1-800 LENS.COM	3,875,337	November 16, 2010
1-800-GET-LENS	2,571,563	May 21, 2002

26 34. Lens also holds common law trademark rights in “Contacts America” and “Just
27 Lenses.”

35. Lens has long viewed the Internet as its central and exclusive means to advertise and build a brand. Lens thus spends its entire ad budget on Internet advertising. From 2003 to 2008 alone, Lens incurred between \$3 million and \$4.7 million in Internet ad expenses.

A PARADIGM SHIFT TO INTERNET SALES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES

36. Upon information and belief, the Relevant Market began a fundamental transformation in or around 1999 from an emphasis on telephone and mail orders – which 1-800 had dominated – to an emphasis on Internet orders. Upon information and belief, for instance, 1-800's Internet sales increased from less than 1 percent of total sales in 1999 to more than 50 percent of total sales in 2006.

37. Contact lens retailers in the Relevant Market rely on Internet search engines, such as Google and Yahoo!, to inform consumers about their business and to direct consumers to their website. Upon information and belief, Internet search engines have become the most important medium for retailers to reach consumers in the Relevant Market; and paid search marketing and sponsored links are accepted as the most reliable advertising method in the Relevant Market. Consumers, in turn, depend on Internet search engines to search and navigate the massive universe of content on the Internet.

38. Upon information and belief, consumers turn to Internet search engines to locate and research alternative retailers in the Relevant Market. Consumers rarely use Internet search engines to locate particular retailers in the Relevant Market, and are unlikely to have particular retailers in mind from which to make their purchase. Rather, these consumers most frequently use search terms such as – *contact, contact lenses, contact lens, contact, lenses* and *lens*. Competitors who are precluded from using these generic terms are thus placed at a significant disadvantage.

HOW SEARCH ENGINES WORK

39. Google, Yahoo! and other Internet search engines transform the chaotic and unwieldy universe of Internet commerce and content into a manageable, invaluable source of comparative information. Search engines offer a central platform for consumers to gather and compare information about alternative products, services, retailers and the like. In short, Internet

1 search engines such as Google and Yahoo! empower consumers to exercise meaningful choice and
 2 taste the fruits of competition.

3 40. Upon information and belief, consumers receive substantial economic benefits from
 4 Internet search engines, including far lower search and transaction costs. Search costs are
 5 inextricably intertwined with consumer choice and retail price. Thus, lower search costs facilitate
 6 comparison shopping and lower prices, while higher search costs impede comparison shopping
 7 and facilitate higher prices and larger profit margins; especially for established vendors.

8 41. Internet search engines work like this: Consumers first type search terms into a text
 9 field to express their interest in particular content. The search engine compares the search terms
 10 against its database of content and then applies an algorithm or formula to retrieve a list of
 11 relevant websites.

12 42. Search engine results are divided into organic links and sponsored links. Organic
 13 links are returned based upon their relevance to search terms. Sponsored links are returned for
 14 websites that have paid for such placement. Google has two sponsored link sections, which
 15 appear above and to the right of organic results.

16 43. To become a sponsored link, advertisers bid on various keywords that, when entered
 17 into the search engine, are guaranteed to return a link to their website. Advertisers can bid upon
 18 and select an unlimited number of keywords, including the same keywords. The order and
 19 location of sponsored links depends on the sum bid for the keyword and the quality of the
 20 advertisement. Advertisers thus do not purchase a particular placement in the list of sponsored
 21 link results.

22 44. Google permits advertisers to designate their keywords with four match options. A
 23 “broad match” will return a sponsored link in response to searches for the keyword, its plural
 24 forms, its synonyms, or similar phrases. A “phrase match” will return a sponsored link in
 25 response to searches for a particular phrase, whether or not additional terms appear before or after
 26 the phrase. An “exact match” will return a sponsored link whenever an exact phrase is entered. A
 27 “negative match” ensures that a sponsored link will not be returned under particular
 28 circumstances.

1 45. Keywords are thus different from search terms and, when triggered, do not reveal a
2 consumer's particular search. 1-800 has deliberately confused these distinct concepts (keywords
3 vs. search terms) in its serial trademark lawsuits against competitors.

4 46. Upon information and belief, sponsored links hold increased importance in the
5 Relevant Market because Internet consumers place substantial value on easy access. According to
6 a sworn statement from Jason Mathison, 1-800's Internet Marketing Manager: "Internet users
7 generally place a high value on the easy accessibility of a website. If too many pop-up
8 advertisements appear on a website, users may become annoyed and may leave the site and/or
9 choose not to return to the website in the future."

10 47. Consumers are more likely to visit and do business with sponsored links.
11 Consumers have greater trust in sponsored links. Consumers also associate sponsored links with
12 greater quality and value.

1-800 HOSTILE TO PRO-COMPETITIVE CHANGES, BUT PREOCCUPIED UNTIL 2007

14 48. Upon information and belief, the Internet was celebrated in most corners for
15 reducing consumer search costs and empowering consumers, but this virtue sparked concern at 1-
16 800.

17 49. Consumers encountered substantial search costs in the Relevant Market prior to the
18 Internet because telephone and mail order reigned supreme. That changed in the Internet age,
19 when, upon information belief, consumers had instant access to comparative information that often
20 exposed 1-800 as the most expensive option in the Relevant Market.

21 50. Upon information and belief, 1-800 was largely unable to act on its frustration until
22 January 2007, however, because it was immersed in a nasty, expensive and protracted battle with
23 ECPs who had “proven to be enormously adept in arriving at new methods to thwart meaningful
24 consumer choice and competition from alternative sellers,” and contact lens manufacturers that
25 used litigation against 1-800 to “impede the flow of information to the consuming public.”

26 51. On January 31, 2007, 1-800 announced that it had “resolved its longstanding supply
27 issue [and] signed long-term supply agreements with its three largest contact lens
28 suppliers,” which meant that 1-800 now had contracts with the four lens manufacturers that

1 represented 98 percent of all soft contact lenses sales in the United States. 1-800 expressed
 2 satisfaction that the agreements represented a final chapter in its extended battle.

3 52. With its resources and attention untangled in 2007, however, 1-800 could and would
 4 reposition its litigation arsenal to point downstream – at its competitors in the Relevant Market.

5 *1-800's SCHEME TO ELIMINATE COMPETITION UNDER GUISE OF TRADEMARK LAW*

6 53. Upon information and belief, 1-800 officials devised a scheme to address their
 7 concerns. The scheme hinged on a fictional collection of trademark rights that 1-800 had
 8 manufactured at least primarily to achieve various anticompetitive objectives, including but not
 9 limited to reduced output, less competition and increased search costs.

10 54. 1-800 understood that consumer awareness and trust are the principal elements of
 11 competition for Internet sales of replacement contact lenses. Upon information and belief, 1-800
 12 crafted a scheme to handicap its competitors on both fronts; that is, consumers would not know of
 13 or not trust the competition, which ensured a significant competitive advantage.

14 55. Beginning in or around 2005, 1-800 implemented a business practice, which called
 15 for 1-800 officials to conduct weekly searches of “1-800 Contacts” and variations thereof on
 16 Google, Yahoo! and other Internet search engines. Upon information and belief, when its weekly
 17 searches returned the sponsored link of a competitor, 1-800 would then accuse the competitor of
 18 purchasing 1-800’s trademark as a keyword from the Internet search engine. Upon information
 19 and belief, 1-800 sent cease and desist correspondence to all such competitors.

20 56. Upon information and belief, 1-800 understood that it had no or little legal basis for
 21 these serious accusations. That is, 1-800 knew that a search for “1-800 Contacts” at
 22 www.google.com would return a list of sponsored links from retailers that acquired a broad match
 23 for keywords like “contact lens” and “contacts” – the most basic nouns in the marketing toolbox
 24 of a contact lens retailer. 1-800 also knew that it did not own the exclusive right to use “1-800
 25 contacts” in any event.

26 57. Undeterred, 1-800 was determined to extract anticompetitive advantage with and
 27 through threats and litigation that forced competitors to incur substantial expense and/or limited
 28 the pool of words suitable for competitors to describe their product in the Relevant Market.

1 *1-800 EXTRACTS HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS*

2 58. Upon information and belief, 1-800 extracted horizontal agreements from several
 3 competitors, under threat of litigation, to restrain trade and reduce output. While fashioned as
 4 “settlements” of 1-800’s trademark infringement accusations, the terms of these horizontal
 5 agreements far exceed the scope of 1-800’s actual limited trademark rights and afford greater
 6 relief to 1-800 than 1-800 could have achieved in litigation.

7 59. Upon information and belief, 1-800 coerced horizontal agreements from competitors
 8 to prevent consumers from securing information about and links to alternative retailers on Internet
 9 search engines. Each agreement represented an express horizontal promise to withhold
 10 information from consumers, restrict consumer choice, reduce output and otherwise eliminate
 11 competition. The agreements eliminated actual or potential competition without limitation as to
 12 duration or geography. 1-800 boasted about these horizontal agreements and even sought to
 13 enforce them through the judicial process.

14 60. Upon information and belief, the competitors were forced to settle without regard to
 15 merits in order to avoid the risk and expense of protracted litigation. Unlike 1-800, most of these
 16 competitors lacked the size and revenues to withstand substantial litigation.

17 *THE LITIGATION MILL*

18 61. Competitors that refused to accept 1-800’s onerous horizontal agreement were
 19 promptly sued for infringement of two 1-800 marks. 1-800 knew that its trademark allegations
 20 had little or no merit, but continued to file and pursue them because its conduct had yielded and
 21 continued to yield tangible anticompetitive benefits.

22 62. Upon information and belief, 1-800 understood that trademark litigation would be
 23 expensive for its competitors. 1-800 filed a slew of repetitive, sham lawsuits against its
 24 competitors in a short period to swamp them with litigation expenses. 1-800 sued its competitors
 25 based on the anticipated consequences upon rivals without regard to the merits of prospective
 26 judicial decisions.

27 63. Upon information and belief, competitors were forced to direct their human and
 28 financial resources at frivolous litigation, which impaired their competitive chances. Given their

1 need to fund on-going litigation, competitors could not afford to lower prices or otherwise invest
 2 in their organization.

3 64. Upon information and belief, with its frivolous trademark infringement lawsuits, 1-
 4 800 hoped to usurp generic terms as protectable trademarks and thus prevent its competitors from
 5 describing their products and services.

6 65. Upon information and belief, 1-800 transformed its competitor litigation into an
 7 efficient and well-oiled machine. 1-800 even generated a form complaint for the frequent
 8 lawsuits, which was always at the ready and required little more than a new caption from lawsuit
 9 to lawsuit.

10 66. Upon information and belief, 1-800 pursued a common pattern in its lawsuits against
 11 competitors. After filing the complaint, 1-800 normally pushed the deadline for defendants to
 12 respond; often several times. 1-800 used the extension periods to place additional pressure on its
 13 competitors. 1-800 framed the extensions as a final chance for its competitors to avoid protracted
 14 litigation and substantial expense. 1-800's competitors often concluded that settlement was the
 15 only choice, without regard to merits. 1-800 would voluntarily dismiss the lawsuits in such cases
 16 with no answer on file; often within weeks after 1-800 filed the complaint.

17 67. Between 2005 and 2010 alone, 1-800 filed at least 15 lawsuits against its
 18 competitors. In each instance, 1-800 sued its competitor without regard to the merits of its claims
 19 and without a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but rather to harass, neutralize and
 20 vanquish its competition. In each instance, 1-800 used litigation as a mechanism to eliminate
 21 competition and expand its limited trademark rights far beyond their actual scope.

22 68. **VISIONDIRECT**. At all times material hereto, VisionDirect was a direct
 23 competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. VisionDirect sold replacement contact lenses to
 24 consumers at www.visiondirect.com, which it owned and operated.

25 69. Upon information and belief, VisionDirect is a distant second place to 1-800 in the
 26 Relevant Market. Nevertheless, upon information and belief, 1-800 has long viewed VisionDirect
 27 as an unacceptable threat to its monopoly power in the Relevant Market.

28

1 70. In accordance with 1-800's frequent use of litigation as an anticompetitive weapon,
2 1-800 filed four lawsuits against VisionDirect between 2002 and 2008 in state and federal courts.
3 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuits and knew it.

4 71. Upon information and belief, 1-800 extracted two horizontal “settlement”
5 agreements from VisionDirect; the first on June 24, 2005 (the “2005 Agreement”), and the second
6 on May 8, 2009 (the “2009 Agreement”). VisionDirect settled the lawsuits to avoid the mounting
7 time and expense associated with the disputes and without regard to the merits.

8 72. Under the 2005 Agreement, VisionDirect was prohibited from “causing [its] website
9 or Internet advertisement to appear in response to any Internet search for [1-800’s] brand name,
10 trademark or URL.” It also prohibited VisionDirect from “causing [its] brand name, or link to
11 [its] Websites to appear as a listing in the search results page of an Internet search engine, when
12 the user specifically searches for [1-800’s] brand name, trademark or URLs.”

13 73. Upon information and belief, VisionDirect and its counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
14 & Rosati, expressed serious antitrust concerns about the enforceability of the 2005 Agreement as it
15 relates to the implementation of negative keywords. On January 24, 2008, Wilson Sonsini wrote
16 1-800's General Counsel:

Separate and apart from Vision Direct's position regarding the interpretation of the contract, set forth in Ms. Caditz's November 5, 2007 letter—that is, that the Agreement does not contemplate the implementation of negative key words—Vision Direct continues to believe that any agreement between the parties with regard to the implementation of negative key words creates an unacceptable risk of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and as such, represents a serious antitrust issue. Any such agreement would appear to represent a restraint unrelated to the terms of the Agreement and unrelated to a valid intellectual property right, and one that depresses the price of key words to search companies such as Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft.

21 || (Emphasis added.)

22 74. Under the 2009 Agreement, 1-800 and VisionDirect agreed to implement negative
23 keyword lists in connection with their Internet advertising efforts. Upon information and belief,
24 VisionDirect expressed concern about the antitrust law problems associated with 1-800's
25 agreement. VisionDirect expressed its concerns in the agreement, which provided:

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Dispute arises out of the allegations that Vision Direct's Internet advertisement appeared in the search results pages of one or more Internet search engines when a user searched for 1-800 Contacts.

WHEREAS, 1-800 Contacts claims that the appearance of such Internet advertisements violates the 2004 Settlement Agreement, and infringes 1-800 Contacts' trademarks;

WHEREAS, Vision Direct and Drugstore.com have raised a concern that an agreement with a competitor to implement negative keywords could implicate the antitrust laws of the United States, and 1-800 Contacts has taken the position that no antitrust laws would be violated by such an agreement;

1
2 (Emphasis added.)
3

4 74. **JSJ ENTERPRISES.** At all times material hereto, JSJ Enterprises, Inc. was a
5 direct competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. JSJ sold replacement contact lenses to
6 consumers at www.contactlensconnection.com, which it owned and operated.
7

8 75. On July 23, 2002, 1-800 sued JSJ in the District of Utah for unfair competition and
9 trademark dilution. 1-800 claimed that JSJ had used its mark as a meta-tag. 1-800 had little or no
10 basis for the lawsuit or its demands.
11

12 76. 1-800 and JSJ settled the lawsuit on August 20, 2002, less than one month after 1-
13 800 filed the lawsuit. Upon information and belief, JSJ capitulated to 1-800's anticompetitive
14 settlement demands rather than incur the huge time and expense associated with litigation.
15

16 77. **Premier Holdings.** At all times material hereto, Premier Holdings was a
17 direct competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Premier sold replacement contact lenses to
18 consumers at www.ezcontactusa.com and www.filmart.com, which it owned and operated.
19

20 78. On December 6, 2007, 1-800 filed suit against Premier Holdings and three
21 individual defendants in the District of Utah for trademark infringement, unfair competition, false
22 designation of origin, false advertising, passing off, copyright infringement, and unjust
enrichment. 1-800 requested in its Demand for Relief that the court issue an injunction that
prevents the defendants "from using any variation of the 1-800 CONTACTS Marks and any other
marks or names that are confusingly similar ...," including, "other identifiers, keywords or other
terms used to attract or divert traffic on the Internet or to secure higher placement within search
engine search results."

23 79. 1-800 included a Google search screenshot in its complaint as visual evidence of
24 Premier Holdings' alleged trademark infringement, which showed:
25

Search Term	Sponsored Links (top section)	Sponsored Links (right-side section)
1800 contacts	www.1800contacts.com	www.CoastalContacts.com www.Lenscrafters.com www.EzContactsUSA.com www.ShipMyContacts.com www.LensDiscounters.com

1 80. 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

2 81. The parties entered into eight consecutive stipulations to extend the answer in order
3 to “enable ongoing settlement negotiations to continue.” 1-800 dismissed the lawsuit on May 13,
4 2008. Upon information and belief, Premier Holdings capitulated to 1-800’s anticompetitive
5 settlement demands rather than incur the huge time and expense associated with litigation.

6 82. **LENSWORLD**. At all times material hereto, LensWorld was a direct competitor
7 of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. LensWorld sold replacement contact lenses to consumers at
8 www.lensworld.com, www.contactmania.com and www.contactlensworld.com, which it owned
9 and operated.

10 83. 1-800 sued LensWorld in the District of Utah on January 8, 2008 for trademark
11 infringement, unfair competition, common law dilution, unjust enrichment and copyright
12 infringement. The complaint was almost identical to 1-800’s previous complaint against Lens.

13 84. 1-800 complained that “[t]he ad for LensWorld’s website is directly generated by a
14 search for 1800 CONTACTS and thus, LensWorld uses the 1800 CONTACTS trademark as a
15 triggering keyword to display and promote LensWorld’s directly competitive goods and services.”
16 1-800 included a Google search screenshot in its complaint as visual evidence of LensWorld’s
17 alleged trademark infringement, which showed:

Search Term	Sponsored Links (top section)	Sponsored Links (right-side section)
1800contacts	www.1800contacts.com	www.LensWorld.com www.Lens.com www.JustLenses.com www.discountedcontactlense.com www.ContactLens.com

22 85. In its Demand for Relief, 1-800 asked the court to issue an injunction that prevented
23 LensWorld “from using any variation of the 1-800 CONTACTS Marks and any other marks or
24 names that are confusingly similar ...,” including, “other identifiers, keywords or other terms used
25 to attract or divert traffic on the Internet or to secure higher placement within search engine search
26 results.” 1-800 had no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

27 86. LensWorld requested an extension of time from 1-800 to answer the complaint after
28 LensWorld missed the initial deadline of February 25, 2008. 1-800 refused to stipulate to an

1 extension unless LensWorld “agree[d] to institute a negative keyword campaign that would
 2 prevent their sponsored advertisements from being generated in response to searches for [1-800’s]
 3 trademarks and confusingly similar variations thereof while we negotiate a settlement in good
 4 faith.” LensWorld agreed and incorporated the requested negative keywords.

5 87. In all, 1-800 and LensWorld stipulated to six separate extensions of the answer
 6 deadline to discuss settlement. The final extension expired on July 25, 2008. 1-800 drafted and
 7 filed a motion for default judgment and proposed order on September 8, 2008. 1-800’s proposed
 8 order directed that LensWorld “shall implement the negative keywords attached hereto as Exhibit
 9 A in any search engine advertising campaign performed for the benefit of [LensWorld], where
 10 possible, for so long as any one of [1-800’s] federally registered trademarks remain active.” The
 11 list included 36 different search terms, including “www.contacts.com.” The proposed order was
 12 entered on September 9, 2008.

13 88. **MEMORIAL EYE.** At all times material hereto, Memorial Eye P.A. was a direct
 14 competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Memorial Eye sold replacement contact lenses to
 15 consumers at www.shipmycontacts.com, www.ship-my-contacts.com and
 16 www.iwantcontacts.com, which it owned and operated.

17 89. 1-800 first complained to Memorial Eye about alleged trademark infringement in a
 18 September 13, 2005 demand letter. 1-800 instructed Memorial Eye to “immediately remov[e]
 19 **ALL** sponsored advertisements that you have purchased through Google, Yahoo Search, and any
 20 other search engines which are triggered by the 1800 CONTACTS trademark.”

21 90. Memorial Eye’s responded through its outside counsel on October 13, 2005.
 22 Memorial Eye explained that it had “never used, or even considered using, [1-800’s] trademark in
 23 its sponsored advertisements, or even as a search phrase trigger.” Memorial Eye also pointed out
 24 the inherent flaw in 1-800’s accusation: “The fact that your ‘mark’ includes the generic word
 25 ‘contacts’ will obviously results in a search triggering a multitude of other contact lens sites,
 26 including legitimate sponsored advertisements.”

27 91. Undeterred, 1-800 accused Memorial Eye of trademark infringement again on
 28 November 3, 2005. This time, however, 1-800 demanded that Memorial Eye “add [a list of]

1 negative keywords to any campaigns containing search terms related to contact lenses.” The list
 2 set forth 20 different search terms, including “contacts.com” and “800contacts.”

3 92. On September 12, 2007, 1-800 rehashed its prior accusations in a third demand
 4 letter to Memorial Eye. In its response, Memorial Eye again explained the flaw in 1-800’s
 5 argument and logic: “The fact that 1800 Contacts, Inc.’s ‘marks’ include the generic word
 6 ‘contacts’ will obviously result in a search triggering a multitude of other contact lens sites,
 7 including legitimate sponsored advertisements.”

8 93. 1-800 sued Memorial Eye in the District of Utah on December 23, 2008. 1-800
 9 used the same complaint it had used in earlier lawsuits against its competitors in the Relevant
 10 Market, with claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, common law dilution and
 11 unjust enrichment claims.

12 94. 1-800 complained that “[t]he www.shipmycontacts.com website advertisements are
 13 triggered upon a search for 1800CONTACTS and thus, use the 1800 CONTACTS trademark as a
 14 triggering keyword to display and promote Memorial Eye’s directly competitive goods and
 15 services.”

16 95. 1-800 included screenshots from two Google searches in its complaint as visual
 17 evidence of Memorial Eye’s alleged trademark infringement, which showed:

Search Term	Sponsored Links (top section)	Sponsored Links (right-side section)
1800contacts	www.1800contacts.com	www.ShipMyContacts.com www.LensDiscounters.com www.AllAboutContactLens.Info www.JustLenses.com www.ContactLens.com/contacts
1800contacts	www.1800contacts.com www.ShipMyContacts.com	www.LensDiscounters.com www.OptiContacts.com www.ContactLens.com

24 96. 1-800 asked for an order to prevent Memorial Eye “from using any variation of the
 25 1-800 CONTACTS Marks and any other marks or names that are confusingly similar ...,”
 26 including, “other identifiers, keywords or other terms used to attract or divert traffic on the
 27 Internet or to secure higher placement within search engine search results.” 1-800 had little or no
 28 basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

1 97. Given the identical arguments and issues raised in 1-800's lawsuits against
 2 Memorial Eye and Lens, the court stayed this lawsuit pending the outcome of 1-800's lawsuit
 3 against Lens.

4 98. **LENSFAST**. At all times material hereto, Lensfast, L.L.C., was a direct
 5 competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Lensfast sold replacement contact lenses to
 6 consumers at www.lensfast.com, www.contactlens.com, and www.e-contacts.com, which it
 7 owned and operated. It also sold contacts over the telephone at 1-800 LENSFASST.

8 99. 1-800 accused Lensfast of trademark infringement in demand letters of September
 9 12, 2007 and March 14, 2008. Both times, 1-800 demanded that Lensfast "immediately remove
 10 **ALL** sponsored advertisements that you have purchased through Google, Yahoo Search, and any
 11 other search engines which are triggered by the 1800 CONTACTS trademark of a confusingly
 12 similar variation thereof." 1-800 demanded that Lensfast "incorporate [a] list of negative
 13 keywords in any continued sponsored advertisement campaign." 1-800 specified 30 different
 14 search terms on its list, including "www.contacts.com."

15 100. On December 23, 2008, 1-800 sued Lensfast and Randolph Weigner in the District
 16 of Utah. 1-800 used the same complaint it had used in earlier lawsuits against its competitors in
 17 the Relevant Market, with claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, common law
 18 dilution and unjust enrichment claims.

19 101. 1-800 complained that "[t]he www.lensfast.com website advertisements are
 20 triggered upon a search for 1800CONTACTS and thus, use the 1800 CONTACTS
 21 trademark as a triggering keyword to display and promote Lensfast's directly competitive goods
 22 and services." 1-800 included a screenshot as visual evidence of Lensfast's allegedly offending
 23 practices.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

1 102. 1-800 included screenshots from two Google searches in its complaint as visual
 2 evidence of Lensfast's alleged trademark infringement, which showed:

Search Term	Sponsored Links (top section)	Sponsored Links (right-side section)
1800contacts	www.1800contacts.com	www.VisionDirect.com www.LensWorld.com www.Lens.com www.ContactLens.com www.JustLenses.com www.discountedcontactlense.com
1800contacts	www.1800contacts.com	www.ContactLens.com

9 103. 1-800 asked for an order to prevent Lensfast and Mr. Weigner "from using any
 10 variation of the 1-800 CONTACTS Marks and any other marks or names that are confusingly
 11 similar ...," including, "other identifiers, keywords or other terms used to attract or divert traffic
 12 on the Internet or to secure higher placement within search engine search results." 1-800 had little
 13 or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

14 104. 1-800 dismissed its lawsuit against Lensfast with prejudice on February 2, 2010.
 15 Upon information and belief, Lensfast capitulated to 1-800's prior settlement demands rather than
 16 incur the substantial fees and expenses associated with litigation.

17 105. **LENSES FOR LESS.** At all times material hereto, Lenses For Less was a direct
 18 competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Lenses For Less replacement contact lenses to
 19 consumers at www.lensesforless.com, which it owned and operated.

20 106. On January 20, 2010, 1-800 filed a lawsuit against Lenses For Less in the District
 21 of Utah for trademark infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment.
 22 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

23 107. While similar in tone to the previous complaints, 1-800 changed its form complaint
 24 against competitors in two important respects. First, 1-800 did not include any screenshots of
 25 Google searches. Second, 1-800 now claimed that all competitors must implement 1-800's list of
 26 negative keywords to avoid infringing upon 1-800's trademark. Thus, inaction now served as the
 27 basis of 1-800's lawsuits. 1-800 complained that "Defendant has not sufficiently implemented the
 28 1-800 Contacts marks (and confusingly similar variations or misspellings thereof) as negative
 keywords, but has instead voluntarily and consciously participated in causing its competitive

1 advertisements to be displayed in response to consumers searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks
 2 and Plaintiff's Goods and Services."

3 108. 1-800 also changed its Demand for Relief. 1-800 now wanted an order directing its
 4 competitors to "implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar variations and
 5 misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising campaigns."

6 109. 1-800 voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit against Lenses for Less with prejudice
 7 March 29, 2010. Lenses for Less never filed an answer. Upon information and belief, Lenses for
 8 Less capitulated to 1-800's prior anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial fees
 9 and expenses associated with litigation.

10 110. **ARLINGTON CONTACT LENS SERVICE.** At all times material hereto,
 11 Arlington Contact Lens Service, Inc., d/b/a Discount Contact Lenses, was a direct competitor of 1-
 12 800 in the Relevant Market. Arlington owned and operated www.discountcontactlenses.com and
 13 www.aclens.com. Arlington sold replacement contact lenses to consumers at
 14 www.discountcontactlenses.com and www.aclens.com.

15 111. Upon information and belief, Arlington is a distant fourth place to 1-800 in the
 16 Relevant Market. Nevertheless, upon information and belief, 1-800 has long viewed Arlington as
 17 an unacceptable threat to its monopoly power in the Relevant Market.

18 112. On February 18, 2010, 1-800 sued Arlington in the District of Utah for trademark
 19 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 20 order directing Arlington to "implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar
 21 variations and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 22 campaigns." 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

23 113. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Lenses For Less. 1-800 again
 24 complained that "Defendant has not sufficiently implemented the 1-800 Contacts marks (and
 25 confusingly similar variations or misspellings thereof) as negative keywords, but has instead
 26 voluntarily and consciously participated in causing its competitive advertisements to be displayed
 27 in response to consumers searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks and Plaintiff's Goods and
 28 Services." 1-800 did not include any screenshots of Google searches in its complaint.

1 114. 1-800 voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit against Arlington on March 10, 2010, less
 2 than three weeks after it was filed. Upon information and belief, Arlington capitulated to 1-800's
 3 anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial fees and expenses associated with
 4 litigation.

5 115. **EMPIRE VISION CENTER.** At all times material hereto, Empire Vision Center
 6 was a direct competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Empire sold replacement contact lenses
 7 to consumers at www.lens123.com, which it owned and operated.

8 116. On February 25, 2010, 1-800 sued Empire in the District of Utah for trademark
 9 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 10 order directing Empire to "implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar
 11 variations and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 12 campaigns." 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

13 117. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Arlington and Lenses For Less. 1-
 14 800 complained that "Defendant has not sufficiently implemented the 1-800 Contacts marks (and
 15 confusingly similar variations or misspellings thereof) as negative keywords, but has instead
 16 voluntarily and consciously participated in causing its competitive advertisements to be displayed
 17 in response to consumers searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks and Plaintiff's Goods and
 18 Services." 1-800 did not include any screenshots of Google searches in its complaint.

19 118. After twice extending the Empire's answer deadline, 1-800 voluntarily dismissed its
 20 lawsuit with prejudice on May 17, 2010. Empire never answered. Upon information and belief,
 21 Empire capitulated to 1-800's anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial fees and
 22 expenses associated with litigation.

23 119. **CONTACT LENS KING.** At all times material hereto, Contact Lens King was a
 24 direct competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Lens King sold replacement contact lenses to
 25 consumers at www.contactlensking.com, which it owned and operated.

26 120. On March 8, 2010, 1-800 sued Lens King in the District of Utah for trademark
 27 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 28 order directing Lens King to "implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar

1 variations and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 2 campaigns.” 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

3 121. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Arlington, Empire and Lenses For
 4 Less. 1-800 complained that “Defendant has not sufficiently implemented the 1-800 Contacts
 5 marks (and confusingly similar variations or misspellings thereof) as negative keywords, but has
 6 instead voluntarily and consciously participated in causing its competitive advertisements to be
 7 displayed in response to consumers searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks and Plaintiff’s Goods
 8 and Services.” 1-800 did not include any screenshots of Google searches in its complaint.

9 122. On April 7, 2010, 1-800 stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. Lens King
 10 never answered. Upon information and belief, Lens King capitulated to 1-800’s anticompetitive
 11 demands rather than incur the substantial fees and expenses associated with litigation.

12 123. **TRAM DATA.** At all times material hereto, Tram Data, LLC was a direct
 13 competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Tram Data sold replacement contact lenses to
 14 consumers at www.replacemycontacts.com, which it owned and operated.

15 124. On May 6, 2010, 1-800 sued Tram Data in the District of Utah for trademark
 16 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 17 order directing Tram Data to “implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar
 18 variations and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 19 campaigns.” 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

20 125. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Arlington, Empire, Lens King and
 21 Lenses For Less. 1-800 complained that “Defendant has not sufficiently implemented the 1-800
 22 Contacts marks (and confusingly similar variations or misspellings thereof) as negative keywords,
 23 but has instead voluntarily and consciously participated in causing its competitive advertisements
 24 to be displayed in response to consumers searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks and Plaintiff’s
 25 Goods and Services.” 1-800 did not include any screenshots of Google searches in its complaint.

26 126. On June 1, 2010, around three weeks after its filing, 1-800 stipulated to dismiss the
 27 lawsuit with prejudice. Tram Data never answered. Upon information and belief, Tram Data
 28

1 capitulated to 1-800's anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial fees and expenses
 2 associated with litigation.

3 127. **WALGREEN COMPANY.** At all times material hereto, Walgreen Co. was a
 4 direct competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Walgreen sold replacement contact lenses to
 5 consumers at www.walgreens.com, which it owned and operated.

6 128. 1-800 accused Walgreen of trademark infringement in March 2010 and April 2010.
 7 Walgreen responded that it "does not currently use the name 1-800 CONTACTS or any
 8 combination of '800' and Contacts' as a search term or keyword."

9 129. On June 8, 2010, 1-800 sued Walgreen in the District of Utah for trademark
 10 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 11 order for Walgreen to "implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar variations
 12 and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 13 campaigns." 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

14 130. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Arlington, Empire, Tram Data, Lens
 15 King and Lenses For Less. 1-800 complained that "Defendant has not sufficiently implemented
 16 the 1-800 Contacts marks (and confusingly similar variations or misspellings thereof) as negative
 17 keywords, but has instead voluntarily and consciously participated in causing its competitive
 18 advertisements to be displayed in response to consumers searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks
 19 and Plaintiff's Goods and Services." 1-800 did not include any screenshots of Google searches in
 20 its complaint.

21 131. On June 30, 2010, around three weeks after its filing, 1-800 and Walgreen
 22 stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. Walgreen never answered. Upon information and
 23 belief, Walgreen capitulated to 1-800's anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial
 24 fees and expenses associated with litigation.

25 132. **STANDARD OPTICAL.** At all times material hereto, Standard Optical was a
 26 direct competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Standard Optical sold replacement contact
 27 lenses to consumers at www.standardoptical.net, which it owned and operated.

28

1 133. On July 13, 2010, 1-800 sued Standard Optical in the District of Utah for trademark
 2 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 3 order for Standard Optical to “implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar
 4 variations and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 5 campaigns.” 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

6 134. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Arlington, Empire, Walgreen, Tram
 7 Data, Lens King and Lenses For Less. 1-800 complained that “Defendant has not sufficiently
 8 implemented the 1-800 Contacts marks (and confusingly similar variations or misspellings
 9 thereof) as negative keywords, but has instead voluntarily and consciously participated in causing
 10 its competitive advertisements to be displayed in response to consumers searching for the 1-800
 11 Contacts marks and Plaintiff’s Goods and Services.” 1-800 did not include any screenshots of
 12 Google searches in its complaint.

13 135. On February 7, 2011, 1-800 and Standard Optical stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit
 14 with prejudice. Upon information and belief, Standard Optical capitulated to 1-800’s
 15 anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial fees and expenses associated with
 16 litigation.

17 136. **WEB EYE CARE.** At all times material hereto, Web Eye Care, Inc. was a direct
 18 competitor of 1-800 in the Relevant Market. Eye Care sold replacement contact lenses to
 19 consumers at www.webeyecare.com, which it owned and operated.

20 137. On August 10, 2010, 1-800 sued Eye Care in the District of Utah for trademark
 21 infringement, unfair competition, false advertising and unjust enrichment. 1-800 requested an
 22 order for Eye Care to “implement the 1-800 Contacts marks and all confusingly similar variations
 23 and misspellings thereof as negative keywords in all of their search engine advertising
 24 campaigns.” 1-800 had little or no basis for the lawsuit or its demands.

25 138. 1-800 used the same complaint it used against Arlington, Empire, Tram Data, Lens
 26 King, Standard Optical and Lenses For Less. 1-800 complained that “Defendant has not
 27 sufficiently implemented the 1-800 Contacts marks (and confusingly similar variations or
 28 misspellings thereof) as negative keywords, but has instead voluntarily and consciously

1 participated in causing its competitive advertisements to be displayed in response to consumers
2 searching for the 1-800 Contacts marks and Plaintiff's Goods and Services." 1-800 did not
3 include any screenshots of Google searches in its complaint.

4 139. On September 13, 2010, 1-800 stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice.
5 Eye Care never answered. Upon information and belief, Eye Care capitulated to 1-800's
6 anticompetitive demands rather than incur the substantial fees and expenses associated with
7 litigation.

1-800's HARASSMENT AND FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT AGAINST LENS.COM

9 136. Upon information and belief, Lens is a distant third place to 1-800 in the Relevant
10 Market. Nevertheless, upon information and belief, 1-800 has long viewed Lens as an
11 unacceptable threat to its monopoly power in the Relevant Market.

12 137. 1-800 began its harassment of Lens in or around 2005 pursuant to a pattern and 1-
13 800's business practice of threatening and suing competitors in the Relevant Market without
14 regard to the merits and for an unlawful purpose.

15 138. 1-800 first accused Lens of a “targeted scheme to infringe upon the 1-800
16 CONTACTS trademark” in a demand letter from 1-800’s in-house counsel on September 1, 2005.
17 1-800 explained the basis for its accusation: An advertisement for Lens was “triggered upon a
18 search for ‘1800 CONTACTS’ and thus, uses the 1800 CONTACTS trademark as a triggering
19 keyword to advertise for your directly competitive goods and services.”

20 139. 1-800 demanded that Lens cease and desist from all infringing activities and ensure
21 that Lens ads never appear when “1800 CONTACTS” is entered as a search term in Google,
22 Yahoo or any other Internet search engine. 1-800 included screenshots from Google and other
23 Internet search engines as visual evidence of Lens’ alleged infringement.

24 140. More accusations followed from 1-800 in late 2005 and mid-2007. 1-800 again
25 attached screenshots from Google and other Internet search engines as visual evidence of Lens'
26 alleged trademark infringement.

27 141. 1-800 sought to extract a horizontal agreement from Lens to settle its manufactured
28 trademark dispute. The proposed terms would have expanded 1-800's limited trademark rights

beyond recognition. The terms also demanded that Lens police the Relevant Market for what 1-800 perceived as a violation of 1-800's trademark rights.

3 142. Upon information and belief, if Lens refused the agreement, 1-800 intended to both
4 overwhelm Lens with enormous litigation expenses and distract Lens with scorched-earth
5 litigation tactics. 1-800 wanted to make sure that Lens was forced to redirect its human and
6 financial resources to the litigation, rather than competition on the merits.

THE LAWSUIT

8 143. Lens refused to accept 1-800's horizontal agreement. On August 18, 2007, 1-800
9 sued Lens in the District of Utah for federal trademark infringement, federal unfair competition
10 and false designation of origin, common law unfair competition, misappropriation, and trademark
11 infringement, state law unfair practices, unjust enrichment, breach of contract and state unfair
12 competition. *See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc.*, No. 2:07-cv-00591 (D. Utah).

13 144. 1-800 filed its trademark infringement lawsuit against Lens in bad faith and forced
14 Lens to incur massive litigation costs (in excess of \$1,400,000). 1-800's litigation crusade
15 constituted a serious threat to competition.

16 145. 1-800 complained that “[t]he www.Lens.com and www.Justlenses.com website
17 advertisements are triggered upon a search for 1800 CONTACTS and thus, use the 1800
18 CONTACTS trademark as a triggering keyword to display and promote Lens.com’s direct
19 competitive goods and services.”

146. 1-800 included three screenshots of Google searches in its complaint as visual
evidence of Lens' trademark infringement, which show:

Search Term	Sponsored Links (top section)	Sponsored Links (right-side section)
1800 CONTACTS	www.1800contacts.com	www.Lens.com www.LensWorld.com www.ShipMyContacts.com www.JustLenses.com
1800contact	www.1800contacts.com	www.Acuvue.com www.LensWorld.com www.JustLenses.com
1800contacts	www.1800contacts.com www.Lens.com,	www.JustLenses.com www.LensWorld.com www.discountedcontactlense.com

1 147. Ironically, 1-800 was engaged in identical practices to those it sued Lens and other
2 competitors for; and on a much larger scale. Upon information and belief, 1-800 purchased 13
3 keywords that contained or reflected Lens' service marks, which generated 8,477 hits for 1-800
4 and profits of \$219,314.00.

5 148. 1-800 alleged that Lens and 1-800 had entered a horizontal non-compete agreement
6 in September 2005, which Lens later breached. 1-800's counsel described the horizontal
7 agreement as follows: "The main thrust of the agreement was that neither parties' advertisements
8 should be appearing on Internet searches for the tradename of the other, if informed of such
9 occurrence. More specifically, upon notice of any such advertisement, Lens.com would ensure
10 that no advertisements for Lens.com would appear in response to searches for 1-800 Contacts'
11 trademarks on Internet search engines."

12 149. In its Demand for Relief, 1-800 requested that the court issue an injunction to
13 prevent Lens.com “from using any variation of the 1-800 CONTACTS Marks and any other marks
14 or names that are confusingly similar ...,” including, “sponsored advertising triggers, other
15 identifiers, keywords or other terms used to attract or divert traffic on the Internet or to secure
16 higher placement within the search engine results.”

17 150. Given that Lens only operated on the Internet, this lawsuit would ensure the demise
18 of Lens if 1-800 prevailed and further reduce the competitive pressures on 1-800.

1-800 SPENDS \$1,100,000 IN LITIGATION FEES IN ITS VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF \$20.51 IN DAMAGES

21 1-800 unleashed the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear war against Lens in
22 response to the damage equivalent of a hangnail. In the end, 1-800 spent around \$1,100,000 in
23 litigation fees in order to chase \$20.51 in damages but, more importantly, to put Lens out of
24 business.

25 152. 1-800 understood that it suffered little or no damage from the alleged conduct it
26 attributed to Lens, even if it prevailed. At most, 1-800's claim against Lens implicated nine (9)
27 variations of 1-800 keywords that generated only about 25 total clicks and **\$20.51** in profits for
28 Lens.

1 153. Notwithstanding its damage ceiling, 1-800 poured enormous financial and other
2 resources into the Lens lawsuit. After 12 months of litigation, 1-800 had spent **\$653,374.15** in
3 fees and expenses. And 1-800 was prepared to spend far more to make its point. The Radar Firm
4 that represented 1-800 promised to discount its services and not bill more than **\$750,000** in 2008,
5 and the Radar Firm later agreed to cap its fees in the Lens litigation at **\$1,100,000** from inception
6 to conclusion. *See Rader Fishman & Grauer, PPLC v. 1-800 CONTACTS, Inc.*, No. 2:10-cv-
7 00191 (D. Utah).

1-800 SCRAMBLES TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM PRIOR ACCUSATIONS AGAINST LENS

9 154. On August 15, 2008, after one full year of litigation, 1-800 abruptly changed its
10 theory and asked for permission to assert that Lens was secondarily liable for the trademark
11 infringement of its affiliates.

12 155. In March of 2009, during a flurry of last-minute dispositive motion practice, 1-800
13 tried to further distance itself from the accusations it leveled at Lens in its August 2007 complaint.
14 1-800 reframed its lawsuit as follows: “[T]he primary thrust of this cases [sic] involves the
15 keyword activities of Lens.com Affiliates.”

1-800'S LAWSUIT IS TOSSED AND DISTRICT COURT RAISES ANTITRUST CONCERN

17 156. On December 14, 2010, the district court dismissed 1-800's lawsuit in an extensive
18 65-page Memorandum Decision and Order from Judge Clark Waddoups.

19 157. The court found that “[1-800] has presented no evidence to show that [Lens] ever
20 purchased [1-800’s] exact service mark as a keyword.” (Emphasis added.) At most, according to
21 the Memorandum Decision, 1-800’s lawsuit against Lens boiled down to Lens’ use of nine
22 misspellings or variations of a mark that generated about 25 clicks and \$20.51 in profits for Lens.

158. The district court determined that “1800 Contacts” was a weak mark in the Internet
search engine context because the “nature of how third parties use generic and descriptive words
on search engines” suggested that users who entered the term were likely searching for a type of
product.

27

111

1 159. In dismissing 1-800's claim for secondary trademark infringement, Judge
 2 Waddoups expressed frustration with 1-800's shotgun approach and failure to explain or develop
 3 the claim. According to the Memorandum Decision and Order:

4 a) "The court notes that this decision was greatly complicated by the imprecise
 5 pleadings of [1-800]. Throughout its briefing, it failed to sort out the actions of [Lens] from its
 6 affiliates, true trademarks from marks it merely asserts are trademarks, and so forth. Such pleading
 7 forces the court to do the work that should have been done by the party and does little to advance
 8 one's case."

9 b) "In its Amended Complaint, [1-800] asserts a claim for secondary
 10 infringement against [Lens] that lumps all theories of secondary liability under one cause of
 11 action. In its briefing for summary judgment, [1-800] also takes little care to sort out the different
 12 theories of secondary infringement, despite the fact that they have different elements."

13 c) "The court will not consider theories of liability that a plaintiff spends so
 14 little effort in developing. It is the party's role to present evidence and develop theories, not the
 15 court's to cull through the evidence to see if a theory may be supported."

16 160. In dismissing 1-800's trademark infringement claim, Judge Waddoups questioned
 17 whether 1-800's argument and conduct raised antitrust law concerns. According to the
 18 Memorandum Decision and Order: "As stated above, Plaintiff sends cease and desist letters
 19 anytime a competitor's advertisement appears when Plaintiff's mark is entered as a search term.
 20 Were Plaintiff actually able to preclude competitor advertisements from appearing on a search-
 21 results page anytime its mark is entered as a search term, it would result in an anti-competitive,
 22 monopolistic protection, to which it is not entitled. Because a consumer cannot see a keyword, nor
 23 tell what keyword generated an advertisement, the court concludes that the mere purchase of a
 24 trademark as a keyword cannot alone result in consumer confusion. Accordingly, the relevant
 25 inquiry here regarding consumer confusion is not just what keyword was purchased, but what was
 26 the language of the advertisement generated by that keyword."

27 161. In dismissing 1-800's breach of contract claim, Judge Waddoups expressed
 28 skepticism that the alleged contract between 1-800 and Lens could survive an antitrust challenge.

1 According to the Memorandum Decision and Order: “Were this actually an agreement entered
 2 into by the parties, the court questions whether it would survive an antitrust challenge. [1-800]
 3 does not seek merely to preclude usage of its trademark. Instead, it wants to obliterate any other
 4 competitor advertisement from appearing on a search-results page when a consumer types in
 5 ‘1800Contacts’ as a search term or some variation of it. This is disturbing given that broad
 6 matching of the generic term ‘contacts’ could trigger an advertisement if a consumer enters the
 7 search term ‘1800Contacts.’ A trademark right does not grant its owner the right to stamp out
 8 every competitor advertisement.”

9 162. 1-800 was also exposed as duplicitous. According to the Memorandum Decision,
 10 1-800 had purchased 13 keywords that reflected Lens’ service marks, which brought 8,477 hits to
 11 1-800 and profits of \$219,314.00. Judge Waddoups explained: “In comparison, from about 2002
 12 through 2008, [1-800] purchased the following keywords from Google: 1 800 lens; 1 800 lense; 1
 13 800 lenses; 1 800 the lens; 1 800 Lens; 1-800 lens; 1800 lenses; 1800lens; 1800lenses; 1-800-
 14 lenses; 800 lens; 800 lenses; 800lens. These keywords generated 91,768 impressions, 8,477 clicks,
 15 and about \$219,314 in profits for [1-800].”

16 163. Although it lost on the merits after 3 years of litigation, 1-800 is not done. 1-800
 17 now hopes to reopen its frivolous lawsuit based on alleged “new” evidence and further deplete the
 18 limited resources of Lens with continued litigation. 1-800 has no basis to reopen the lawsuit.
 19 Contrary to its representations, the “new” evidence is not new. The District of Utah dismissed 1-
 20 800’s lawsuit on December 14, 2010, while 1-800 so-called “new evidence” is from November 30,
 21 2009.

22 164. Upon information and belief, 1-800 had and has no legitimate competitive
 23 justifications for its practices, which neither reduced distribution costs, facilitated competition nor
 24 achieved efficiencies.

25 165. Upon information and belief, the sole purpose of 1-800’s conduct was to protect
 26 and extend its dominance in the Relevant Market. Any manufactured business justifications are
 27 mere pretext.

28

166. Any efficiencies or cost savings that 1-800 might claim to achieve with its conduct could be achieved through alternative, less-restrictive means that do not harm competition.

COMPETITIVE EFFECTS

167. 1-800's anticompetitive practices have had a direct, substantial and adverse effect on competition in the Relevant Market.

168. 1-800's horizontal agreements have increased consumer search costs by hindering consumers from obtaining valuable information about the various alternatives available from sellers.

169. Consumers in the Relevant Market have been denied the fruits of competition, including greater choice, superior products and services, and lower prices. 1-800 has used threats and litigation to expand its limited trademark rights far beyond their actual scope and otherwise restrict the menu of choices for consumers. 1-800 has extracted horizontal agreements from competitors to restrict output and consumer choice. Customers in the Relevant Market have been denied the benefits of innovation, including greater convenience and increased efficiencies. Although consumers benefit and profit from greater information upon which to make informed purchasing decisions, 1-800 has worked to prevent consumers from receiving such information and otherwise engaging in comparative advertising.

170. Competition in the Relevant Market between 1-800 and its competitors (actual and prospective) has been suppressed and/or eliminated. 1-800 has used litigation as a mechanism to deplete the financial and human resources of its competitors. 1-800 has forced competitors to incur substantial litigation expenses. 1-800 has prohibited competitors in the Relevant Market from engaging in perfectly acceptable forms of advertising. 1-800 claimed exclusive control and rights over words that were freely available to all competitors and used its bogus claims to coerce unreasonable restraints of trade and to acquire and/or extend its monopoly power. 1-800 has prevented competitors from using common, generic terms to attract customers and describe their products in the Relevant Market. 1-800's extorted settlements have foreclosed and continue to foreclose a substantial share of the Relevant Market, and impede the ability of prospective and actual competitors to compete against 1-800 on the merits. 1-800's conduct makes it difficult for

1 prospective and actual competitors to achieve efficient scale and attract a sufficient customer base
2 in the Relevant Market.

3 171. 1-800 has restricted output in the Relevant Market. Advertising is an important
4 component of a firm's output and essential to effective distribution; and the relationship between
5 advertising and low prices is plain.

6 172. 1-800 has facilitated collusion by eliminating various avenues down which
7 competition can occur. By restricting advertising, 1-800 has made it far more difficult for
8 individual firms to communicate additional services to consumers (e.g., free delivery, stocking,
9 extended warranties, or other collateral services), thus stabilizing competition between and among
10 the competitors.

11 173. Left unchecked, 1-800's pattern of conduct will continue its intended effect of
12 harming competition in the Relevant Market. Actual and prospective competitors will be excluded
13 from the Relevant Market and customers will be forced to spend more for less.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Horizontal Restraint of Trade – 15 U.S.C. § 1)

174. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

17 175. 1-800 has entered into various unlawful contracts, combinations or conspiracies that
18 unreasonably restrain interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

19 176. 1-800 extracted anticompetitive concessions from its direct competitors in the
20 settlement agreements that fell outside the scope of its actual trademark rights and the limited
21 protection granted by trademark laws.

22 177. 1-800's horizontal agreements are per se unlawful. In the alternative, 1-800's
23 horizontal agreements are unlawful under the rule of reason.

24 178. 1-800 entered into the arrangements with the purpose and effect of unreasonably
25 restraining trade and commerce in the Relevant Market.

26 179. The probable effect of the arrangements is to foreclose competition in a substantial
27 share of the Relevant Market.

28 180. 1-800's conduct has had anticompetitive effects in the Relevant Market, including
those described above.

181. Lens has been injured in its business or property due to 1-800's conduct.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Monopoly Maintenance – 15 U.S.C. § 2)

182. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

183. 1-800 has engaged in unlawful monopoly maintenance in the Relevant Market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

184. 1-800 possesses monopoly power in the Relevant Market.

185. Through the anticompetitive and predacious conduct described herein, 1-800 has willfully maintained and, unless restrained by the Court, will continue to willfully maintain its monopoly power through anticompetitive and unreasonably exclusionary means.

186. 1-800 has acted with an intent to illegally maintain 1-800's monopoly power in the Relevant Market.

187. 1-800 has directly and proximately prevented actual and prospective competitors from obtaining a significant, non-trivial share of the Relevant Market.

188. 1-800's conduct has had anticompetitive effects in the Relevant Market, including those described above.

189. Lens has been injured in its business or property due to 1-800's conduct.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Attempted Monopoly – 15 U.S.C. § 2)

190. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

191. 1-800 has engaged in anticompetitive conduct in an attempt to monopolize the Relevant Market.

192. 1-800 has acted with specific intent to achieve a monopoly in the Relevant Market.

193. Given 1-800's substantial market share and size, there is a dangerous probability that, unless restrained, 1-800 will achieve monopoly power in the Relevant Market.

194. 1-800's conduct has had anticompetitive effects in the Relevant Market, including those described above.

195 Lens has been injured in its business or property due to 1-800's conduct.

1 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
 2 **(Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act)**

3 196. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

4 197. 1-800 has entered into unlawful horizontal contracts, combinations or conspiracies
 5 with its competitors in violation of NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060.

6 198. 1-800 has engaged in unlawful monopoly maintenance in the Relevant Market in
 7 violation of NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060.

8 199. 1-800 has engaged in exclusionary conduct in an attempt to monopolize the
 9 Relevant Market in violation of NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.060. 1-800 has acted with specific intent
 10 to achieve a monopoly in the Relevant Market. Given its substantial size and market share, a
 11 dangerous probability exists that, unless restrained, 1-800 will achieve monopoly power in the
 12 Relevant Market.

13 200. 1-800's conduct has had anticompetitive effects in the Relevant Market, including
 14 those described above.

15 201. Lens has been injured, or is threatened with injury or damage, in its business or
 16 property due to 1-800's conduct.

17 **FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
 18 **(Declaratory Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201)**


19 202. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

20 203. After on summary judgment in 2010 in the Utah litigation, 1-800 is still not done
 21 attempting to stamp out legitimate competition from Lens.

22 204. On February 11, 2011, the court in the Utah litigation issued an Order to Show
 23 Cause requiring that if a party believed that all issues had not been resolved, that party was
 24 ordered to show cause on or before March 10, 2011 why the case should not be closed. Absent a
 25 showing of good cause, the court in Utah indicated that the case would be closed on March 11,
 26 2011.

27 205. 1-800 did not respond to the show cause order. Instead, on April 20, 2011, more
 28 than 4 months after the court in Utah entered summary judgment against 1-800, 1-800 filed a motion deceptively titled "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1 BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF INFRINGEMENT.” Incredibly, the
 2 “new” evidence alleged by 1-800 is search results on the Bing Shopping Site -- search results from
 3 2009 shown in the screen capture below. The search is specifically for finding other vendors who
 4 sell a particular product.



15 206. The comparison done by Bing does not constitute “commercial use” of 1-800’s
 16 marks nor does it constitute infringement of 1-800’s alleged trademark rights in violation of the
 17 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). When a Bing search engine user searched for “1-800” the
 18 search engine’s “shopping” feature returned a list of the products it sold and indicated how many
 19 other businesses were in its data base that also sold the same product. The user could then go to
 20 the competitors’ websites who carry this product and compare prices.

21 207. Despite the inability of the court in Utah to hear these claims, the fact that 1-800
 22 has attempted to assert these claims against Lens shows clearly that there is an actual case or
 23 controversy and that Lens has a reasonable apprehension of litigation. Indeed, 1-800 sent a letter
 24 to Lens in Nevada containing this threat and this threat was also contained in the motion submitted
 25 the court in Utah litigation.

26 208. Lens further seeks a declaration that 1-800 take nothing by way of its claims
 27 asserted against Lens; a declaration and adjudication of the rights and liabilities of the parties with
 28 regard to the 1-800 marks and uses thereof as it relates to this dispute; a declaration that any

1 claims brought by 1-800 against Lens with respect to the 1-800 marks be dismissed with
 2 prejudice; a declaration that Lens' alleged use of the 1-800 mark in the Bing search engine, as
 3 shown above, and any other similar claims later raised by 1-800, are lawful and do not infringe
 4 upon any rights of 1-800; and a declaration of Lens' continued right to use the 1-800 marks for
 5 comparison advertising on Internet search engines or elsewhere, free and clear of interference or
 6 harassment by 1-800 and without any obligation or liability to 1-800.

7 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

8 **(Unfair Competition – Nevada Common Law)**

9 209. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

10 210. 1-800 has used and continues to use its alleged trademark rights to unfairly compete
 11 with and deter fair competition by its competitors, including Lens.

12 211. 1-800 has used and continues to engage vexatious and sham trademark litigation
 13 against its competitors, including Lens, in an effort to impede them from engaging in fair
 14 competition and to eliminate them as competitors.

15 212. 1-800 has used its alleged trademark rights and vexatious and sham trademark
 16 litigation to coerce its competitors, including Lens, to enter into unlawful horizontal restraints on
 17 competition.

18 213. Lens has been injured, or is threatened with injury or damage, in its business or
 19 property due to 1-800's conduct.

20 **SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

21 **(Abuse of Process)**

22 214. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

23 215. On or about August 18, 2007, 1-800 initiated a legal process by filing the lawsuit
 24 captioned 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. . Lens.com, Inc., Case No. 2:07cv00591, in the United States
 District Court for the District of Utah.

25 216. Upon information and belief, 1-800 filed suit with unlawful ulterior purposes or
 26 motives, including, but not limited to: (1) deterring Lens from engaging in lawful competition,
 27 including in connection with advertising on the Internet through the use of sponsored links
 28 triggered by bidding on generic terms; and (2) attempting to impose and imposing on Lens

1 substantial attorneys' fees and costs in an effort to deter Lens from defending its lawful
2 competition.

3 217. Upon information and belief, in the Utah litigation, 1-800 engaged in numerous
4 willful acts in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding,
5 including, but not limited to: (1) pursuing the Utah litigation when it knew that it had no legitimate
6 basis for doing so; (2) making frivolous and/or misleading arguments to the court regarding the
7 nature and scope of 1-800's trademark rights and the nature and use of certain search terms in
8 connection with sponsored links; (3) marking frivolous arguments regarding Lens' alleged
9 secondary liability for the alleged action of affiliates; (4) imposing more than \$1 Million in legal
10 fees and costs on Lens in an action involving, at most, \$20.51 in profits; and (5) after the close of
11 the case, seeking to continue the litigation based on alleged new evidence that 1-800 knew was not
12 new and which did not form the basis for any legitimate claims.

13 218. 1-800 engaged in such abuse of process with no reasonable justification or
14 privilege.

15 219. 1-800's actions were done intentionally and with malice or such reckless disregard
16 to the rights of Lens such that malice can be presumed, thus making this claim appropriate for
17 punitive damages.

18 || 220. Lens has suffered damages in an amount that will be proven at trial.

19 221. Lens also demands an award of punitive damages in the amount to be determined
20 by the jury so as to punish and discourage 1-800 from these actions in the future.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Prima Facie Tort)

222. Lens incorporates by reference all allegations contained above.

24 223. 1-800 is liable for intentionally doing that which is calculated in the ordinary course
25 of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or
trade.

27 224. 1-800 committed an unjustified, intentional infliction of harm on Lens, which resulted in damages, by one or more acts that would otherwise be lawful.

225. 1-800 engaged in such conduct with no reasonable justification or privilege.

226. 1-800's actions were done intentionally and with malice or such reckless disregard to the rights of Lens such that malice can be presumed, thus making this claim appropriate for punitive damages.

227. Lens has suffered damages in an amount that will be proven at trial.

228. Lens also demands an award of punitive damages in the amount to be determined by the jury so as to punish and discourage 1-800 from these actions in the future, as well as attorneys fees and the costs of this action.

PRAAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully requests the following relief:

- A. Judgment on all counts in favor of Lens and against 1-800;
 - B. A declaration that Lens is not engaged in any activity that infringes upon any alleged trademark rights of 1-800 (and for the other declaratory relief identified in the above);
 - C. An award of compensatory, consequential, incidental, treble and punitive damages in favor of Lens and against 1-800 in an amount to be determined at trial;
 - D. An injunction to enjoin and restrain the 1-800 from engaging in any of the illegal conduct identified in the Complaint;

111

111

111

111

111

E. Attorneys' fees, costs and expenses of bringing this lawsuit, with interest at the highest legal rate until paid in full; and

F. An award of such other relief that the Court may deem proper, necessary or appropriate.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2011.

Respectfully submitted,

LEWIS AND ROCA LLP

By: /s/ Michael J. McCue
Michael J. McCue (Nevada Bar No. 6055)
mmccue@LRLAW.com
John L. Krieger (Nevada Bar No. 6023)
3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Tel: (702) 949-8200
Fax: (702) 949-8363

David D. Weintraub (*Admitted pro hac vice*)
dweintraub@LRLAW.com
LEWIS AND ROCA LLP
40 North Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Tel: (602) 262-5311
Fax: (602) 262-5358

Anthony J. DeGidio
(pro hac vice application to be submitted)
712 Farrer St.
Maumee, Ohio
Tel: (419) 509-1878
Fax: (419) 740-2556

Attorneys for Plaintiff